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Abstract
The transformation of corporate governance has only recently come into the focus of the 
academic debate on the transformation of the varieties of capitalism in the European arena. While 
most studies still are either focused on a comparative analysis of the transformation of national 
systems of corporate governance or rather technical aspects of the changing conﬁgurations 
and mechanisms of corporate governance, analyses of the ongoing transformative political 
processes on the European level are still scarce.   
 This research project is aimed at shedding some light on the often neglected essentially 
political dimension of the transformation of corporate governance regulation in the European 
Union. While to a certain extent drawing on the Varieties of Capitalism approach, the focus of 
this research is none the less not merely comparative. Rather, this research seeks to map out 
and explain the transformative processes of corporate governance regulation - in particular with 
regard to the market for corporate control as an important element of corporate governance 
- within the context of the European integration project. It does so by drawing on an analysis 
of these transformations which moves beyond state-centred and rational-choice accounts by 
paying attention to transnational actors as well as the structural factors that inﬂuence them and 
are in turn shaped by them. The struggle over the European Takeover Directive will serve as an 
empirical focal point to analyse the role of the EU in creating a European market for corporate 
control. 
This project is based within the research programme on the ʻTransnational Political Economy 
of Corporate Governance Regulation  ʼ of the Amsterdam Research Centre for Corporate 
Governance Regulation (ARCCGOR), which is funded by the Netherlands Organisation for 
Scientiﬁc Research (NWO). 
 
I am grateful to Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Andreas Nölke, Arjan Vliegenthart, Angela Wigger, 
James Perry, Henk Overbeek and the members of the Amsterdam IPE club for helpful comments 
and critique. 
11 Introduction 
Corporate Governance, which has become a buzzword both in the public and academic debate, 
is of fundamental signiﬁcance for the socio-economic conﬁguration of capitalist modes 
of production. Corporate governance regulation by now is an issue of heated debate in any 
industrialized country, and the reverberations of these transformations can easily be traced 
back to everyday life. Yet with all the buzzing going on, it seems that the political nature and 
underpinnings of any corporate governance system have become obscured, if they have ever 
been observed at all.  
 Within the European Union, we are witnessing a transformation of corporate governance 
regulation which is apparent not only on the various national levels, but also on the European 
level per se. The political processes that bring about these transformations, however, have 
hardly been accounted for – only recently have scholars begun to pay attention to them (Bieling 
and Steinhilber 2002; Ciofﬁ 2002; Gourevitch 2003; Roe 2003). Yet whereas the majority of 
political science studies is so far still focused on the transformation of national systems of 
corporate governance (see f.ex. Frentrop 2002; Höpner 2003b), most legal and business studies 
scholars take a rather normative stance on corporate governance by analysing the transformation 
of corporate governance on the grounds of ﬁnding the ʻbest practice  ʼ- which for most of them, 
incidentally, tends to be of the market-based Anglo-Saxon sort. (Bergloef and Burkart 2003; 
Cuervo 2002; Hansmann and Kraakman 2001). 
 A common objective of many scholars seems to be to participate in the pickʼn mix of the 
convergence debate, which appears to constitute the ultimate purpose of many studies of the 
transformation of corporate governance regulation. Whether there is indeed convergence on a 
speciﬁc corporate governance regime or whether the varieties will, at least to a certain degree, 
persist is, of course, of immediate importance for the development of capitalism in Europe and 
elsewhere. Yet it has hardly been investigated why these processes take place. Instead of resorting 
to simplistic causal models on the grounds of ʻglobalisation  ʼand competitive pressures (or, for 
that matter, path dependent outcomes), the political processes behind these transformations 
have to be the focus of an analysis. 
 Within the framework of ARCCGOR, this research project aims at contributing to the 
academic debate by not buying into the somewhat outcome-oriented focus of already existing 
studies of the transformation of corporate governance in Europe (Cernat 2004; Lannoo 1999; 
Reberioux 2002). Rather, the underlying research question will be based on the one posed by 
Nölke, Overbeek and van Apeldoorn (Nölke et al. 2003) in their initial outline for the ARCCGOR 
programme - What explains the transformation of corporate governance regulation at different 
levels, and through varying modes, of governance?
  In the following, then, I will map out the structure and the research objectives of my 
project. A brief overview on the various strands of literature on corporate governance in general 
and the market for corporate control in particular provides the basis for a discussion of the ʻ state 
of the art  ʼand the identiﬁcation of important gaps and neglected issues in the existing literature. 
2In turn, the scope (and limits) of my research project will be outlined, in particular with regard 
to my main empirical focal point, the Takeover Directive. To locate my project in the academic 
debate and to point out its potential contribution to the study of corporate governance regulation 
in the European Union, a ﬁrst sketch of my theoretical framework with a clariﬁcation of some 
key concepts this research is drawing on will conclude this research outline.  
2 Corporate governance and the market for corporate control revisited
There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally 
strive to increase shareholder value (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001: 439)
Many scholars, in particular in legal and economic ﬁelds, still take corporate governance to be a 
mere mechanism to overcome arising agency costs due to the separation of corporate ownership 
and control (Berle and Means 1991 [1932]) – in short, ʻhow investors get the managers to give 
them back their money  ʼ(Shleifer and Vishny 1996: 4). The ﬁrm or company, in this perspective, 
is nothing else than a ʻnexus of treaties  ʼ(Jensen and Meckling 1976: 8), an act of rational actors 
to guarantee an efﬁcient (re)allocation of wealth by overcoming transaction costs (Coase 1937: 
389). The companyʼs main purpose, thus, is to maximise the cash ﬂow to the shareholders (the 
bearers of residual rights) – giving rise to the concept of shareholder value (Rappaport 1998). 
Any management focus on other stakeholders such as, for instance, employees poses a potential 
threat to this cash ﬂow and has hence to be avoided.
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the 
acceptance by corporate ofﬁcials of a social responsibility other than to make as much 
money for their stockholders as possible (Friedman 1962: 133). 
The market for corporate control (Manne 1965) features prominently in this perception of 
corporate governance as control mechanism to mitigate agency problems - it constitutes the 
primary external control mechanism to ensure the protection of shareholder interests.  Based 
on the premise that there is a high positive correlation between managerial efﬁciency and the 
share price of a company (Manne 1965: 113), the market for corporate control not only serves 
as disciplining mechanism for managers, but also gives shareholders an increased ʻexit  ʼoption, 
i.e. to sell their shares. (see Hirschman 1970)  A functioning market for corporate control 
thus aligns managerial strategies with shareholder interests (ʻmaximizing shareholder valueʼ) 
rather than taking any other socio-economic interests into account.  The evaluation of company 
performance takes place on the grounds of market-based criteria - in the case of a takeover, 
ʻshareholders are not asked to evaluate complex alternative business plans for the company. 
Rather, they need only assess who is offering a higher value for their shares  ʼ (Pound 1993: 
1018). Both technical defences against takeovers, such as attempts to make the target companyʼs 
stock less attractive to the bidder (ʻpoison pillsʼ) or the selling of valuable assets (ʻscorched 
earthʼ),1 and structural obstacles impeding the functioning of the market are thus perceived as 
3detrimental to shareholder interests. 
This distinction between structural vs. technical barriers to takeovers is important for 
the discussion of takeover regulation. As Gilson points out, 
structural barriers simply reﬂect the effect of existing conditions in the economic 
environment, albeit facilitated and reinforced by conditions in the corporate governance and 
political environments. They include such circumstances as the concentration of ownerships 
and small groups, the inﬂuence of large banks and the reliance on debt as opposed to equity 
ﬁnancing  (Gilson 1992: 181). 
 These structural barriers thus pertain to the different socio-economic conﬁgurations 
constituting the various corporate governance systems and varieties of capitalism in general. 
The market for corporate control, however, is far from being a universal feature of corporate 
governance systems. Whereas corporate takeovers have been and still are common in the US 
(see f.ex. Blair 1993 on the ʻDeal Decade  ʼin the US in the 1980s), the absence of a market for 
corporate control has been a distinct characteristic of various ʻ continental  ʼcorporate governance 
systems (de Jong 1997; Streeck 2001). 
3 Approaches to corporate governance  
3. 1 Legal perspectives
The differences between corporate governance systems, of which the market for corporate 
control constitutes a signiﬁcant element, have increasingly been subject to academic debate 
between various ﬁelds. There is a prominent strand of (predominantly American) legal and 
economic scholars arguing for the convergence of corporate governance systems on the above 
shareholder-value model (see Gordon and Roe 2004) – Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) have 
even pronounced the ʻ end of history of corporate law,  ʼclaiming that the pressure of increasingly 
globalised markets, the rise of institutional investors and the sheer superiority and efﬁciency 
of the shareholder value model will inevitably lead to a global convergence on the prevailing 
model, with any divergent models of economic organisation and corporate governance bowing 
out to ruthless competition. 
 Comparative corporate governance has become a popular subject for both social sciences 
and legal studies (OʼSullivan 2003),  yet there is still an underlying normative bias assuming that 
corporate governance will necessarily converge on the most efﬁcient system (see for instance 
Shleifer and Vishny 1996). As Branson puts it, ʼthey construct competing models based upon a 
limited sample of on the one hand the United States and , on the other hand, the UK, Germany 
and France. They then declare the United States the winner of the competition  ʼ(Branson 2001: 
335). 
 Although there have been attempts at more complex explanations for the diversity of corporate 
governance systems, ultimately these fail to account for the underlying political dimension of 
corporate governance. La Porta et al, for instance, having conducted extensive research on 
4the structures of corporate ownership in various advanced industrial countries worldwide (La 
Porta et al 1999), introduce the structure of company law as a variable inﬂuencing corporate 
governance regimes. They conclude that strong investor protection by law (as provided for by 
common law countries like the USA or the UK) facilitates efﬁcient corporate governance (La 
Porta et al 2000). They do not, however, acknowledge the political processes and institutional 
conﬁgurations underlying the emergence and persistence of a particular company law regime 
– thus, changes and transformation of corporate governance systems are still explained by 
exogenously induced changes in (corporate) law (in terms of ʻglobalisation pressuresʼ).  
 The notion of ʻthe political determinants of corporate governance  ʼ has been introduced 
by Mark Roe (Roe 2003). He argues that political forces bring about speciﬁc corporate 
governance systems by being the primary determinants of the degree of shareholder diffusion 
and the relations between managers, shareholders and other stakeholders (Roe 2000; Roe 
2003).  This is a crucial insight, and Roeʼs path-breaking work in this direction constitutes an 
important improvement on the ʻlegal  ʼaccount of differences in corporate governance systems 
(cf Gourevitch 2003). Yet while Roe takes the degree of ʻsocial democracy  ʼas one of the main 
factors inﬂuencing corporate governance systems through generating low shareholder diffusion 
and weak shareholder rights (cf La Porta et al. 2000; Roe 2003: 37), he bases his account on a 
very narrow political interest coalition between managers and employees against shareholders. 
He argues that ʻsocial democracies wedge open the gap between shareholders and managers 
in public ﬁrms, by raising agency costs and reducing the efﬁcacy of techniques that would 
control them  ʼ (Gordon and Roe 2004: 290). This static perception of ﬁxed interests in corporate 
governance systems is, however, ultimately insufﬁcient for explaining the transformation of 
corporate governance since it simply doesnʼt account for the political interests and changing 
power relations between these different actors and the changing outcomes of these processes. 
To identify the various actors involved in processes of corporate governance and to not only 
distinguish their particular agenda, but also the underlying forces shaping them serves to 
(re)politicise corporate governance. This is based on a perception that, rather than being a 
mere control mechanism for shareholders or managers, corporate governance is an area of very 
concrete political contestation. 
3.2  Of varieties and other capitalisms  
Roeʼs perception of the ʻpolitical determinants  ʼ in continental Europe in terms of ʻsocial 
democracy  ʼas institutional arrangement impeding the resolution of ʻthe core problems of the 
public ﬁrm [i.e. agency problems, LH]  ʼ (Gordon and Roe 2004: 252) correlates to a certain 
extent with another approach focusing on the signiﬁcance of institutional arrangements, namely 
the burgeoning literature on the varieties of capitalism (VoC).   
 Within this by now extensive literature, corporate governance constitutes an essential 
element of the institutional conﬁguration of capitalist economic organisation (Hall and Soskice 
2001: 23-24). The debate around the different varieties of capitalism was triggered off by 
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identiﬁed the fundamental differences of varieties of capitalism and argued that the ʻRhenish  ʼ
model of capitalism, which was predominant in continental Europe, would eventually be 
superseded by the ʻ Anglo-Saxon  ʼmodel (Albert 1991). The VoC has since become an important 
branch of the social sciences, and although it is far from being a coherent and uniﬁed approach, 
there are important overlaps and similarities in the various contributions to it.  (see f.ex. Amable 
2000; Aoki 2001; Berger and Dore 1996; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hay 2000; Kitschelt et al. 
1999; Whitley 1999) In marked contrast to much of the economic and legal literature mentioned 
above, the VoC is not based on any normative assumptions of the superiority of any model, 
thus discarding with the view that (institutional) convergence can lead to some sort of ʻbest 
practice  ʼmodel of capitalism. Rather, on the basis of ideal-types of capitalism it is pointing 
towards the inherent institutional features of the various models. For this purpose, the notion 
of ʻinstitutional complementarities  ʼis of utmost signiﬁcance (Hall and Soskice 2001: 17). As 
Crouch and Streeck contend, ʻthe failure to recognize the role of institutions may lead, and 
indeed is currently leading, to the false conclusion that markets alone can sustain economic 
dynamism  ʼ(Crouch and Streeck 1997: 7).
 By setting corporate governance within the context of a broader institutional 
conﬁguration, the VoC allows for a more systematic analysis of the signiﬁcance of corporate 
governance for socio-economic organisation. From this perspective, the absence of a market 
for corporate control, for instance, constitutes a comparative advantage with regard to the 
development of a highly qualiﬁed labour (Streeck 2001). The attention the VoC is paying to 
the different institutional arrangements necessarily leads to its overarching research focus 
on the diversity and the differences between national forms of capitalism. With regard to the 
question of the political dimension of corporate governance, however, this comparative focus 
entails the problem that, in Susan Strangeʼs words, ʻthey donʼt see the wood for the trees, [and] 
overlook the common problems while concentrating on the individual differences  ʼ (Strange 
1997). Drawing on historical institutionalist and comparative politics approaches, the VoC also 
very much remains ontologically tied to the nation-state. 
Many of the most important institutional structures, notably systems of labour market 
regulation, of education and training, and of corporate governance depend on the presence 
of regulatory regimes that are the preserve of the nation-state  (Hall and Soskice 2001: 4). 
This, in turn, also prompts a predominant focus on state actors  ʼinterests when discussing the 
transformation of the regulative environment of corporate governance. (Hall and Soskice 2001: 
57). This, it could be argued, leads to a strong intergovernmentalist bias when identifying the 
actors involved in the politics of corporate governance regulation – the VoC cannot account 
for supra- or transnational actors. In concert with the rather US-centred focused of the other 
approaches mentioned above, this means that there is a clear gap in the literature with regard to 
the international and transnational aspects of the transformation of corporate governance.    
6 Pertaining to the question of changes in corporate governance regulation, the concept of path-
dependence is of great signiﬁcance to account for the persistence of institutional conﬁgurations 
such as corporate governance regimes (Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Greener 2004; Pierson 2000). As 
Bebchuk and Roe contend, ʻthe corporate structures with which a country began will inﬂuence 
those that it will have down the road  ʼ(Bebchuk and Roe 1999: 129) This relates to the historical 
institutionalist account of the VoC, which asserts that national models of corporate governance 
react differently to exogenous pressures. To explain these different outcomes, the VoC draws 
to a large degree on path dependency to reveal the historically speciﬁc cultural, economic and 
social conﬁguration of any variety of capitalism (cf Hall and Soskice 2001). The considerable 
diversity with regard to corporate governance practices, in this view, is thus mainly based on the 
path-dependent nature of these regimes. The insight that the institutional history of corporate 
governance is of vital signiﬁcance for its development is, as such, very important - not only 
that ʻinstitutions matter  ʼ(North 1991) but also that timing and ʻhistory matters.  ʼʻLocked into  ʼ
their speciﬁc institutional conﬁgurations, corporate governance regimes are thus, from a path-
dependency view, likely to persist even under increased pressure from external forces. Yet 
ultimately, path dependency can not account for transformations such as those within the area 
of European corporate governance regulation. As Federowicz and Aguliera point out, in ʻpost 
facto explanations everything might be interpreted as path-dependent, but it offers little insight 
into the mechanisms of institutional change (Aguilera and Federowicz 2003: 5). Whereas path 
dependency can offer an explanation for institutional inertia within a given context of a national 
institutional constellation, it does not have an answer to transnational political processes such as 
supranational EU regulation. Also, the perception of path dependency as mechanically pressing 
institutional development on a certain trajectory does not leave enough room for the contingent 
and conscious agency of actors, both from within the institutional context and from outside. 
Peter Gourevitch argues that ʻthere is nothing inevitable about a countryʼs path, nor is it locked 
in forever. Its trajectory is sustained by interests, ideology and institutions – each of which can 
change  ʼ(Gourevitch 2003: 1866). 
 With respect to the literature on the transformation of corporate governance on the 
European level, there has been a welcome increase of scholars taking on this issue from various 
perspectives. (Bieling and Steinhilber 2002; Cernat 2004; Ciofﬁ 2002; Dewing and Russell 
2004; Höpner 2003a; Lannoo 1999; Lannoo and Khachaturyan 2003; Reberioux 2002; Rhodes 
and Apeldoorn 1998; Streeck 2001; van Apeldoorn 2001) The ongoing changes and rapid 
developments of corporate governance regulation in the European Union are under increasing 
attention from scholars from both political science as well as legal/economic ﬁelds – given the 
signiﬁcance of corporate governance, this development is quite likely to continue. To this date, 
however, there is no coherent systemic account of why the regulation of corporate governance 
in the EU is developing the way we can observe (neither, for that matter, is there agreement 
in what we actually observe with regard to corporate governance in the EU)  Globalisation 
pressures still lead the way as explanation for the transformation of corporate governance 
7regulation, albeit with very different outcomes (Lannoo 1999; compare f.ex. Streeck 2001). 
 The qualitatively changed content and the underlying political reasons for the qualitatively 
changed form of regulation are systematically neglected (but see Bieling and Steinhilber 2002). 
Rather than a descriptive account of which processes are taking place at different levels, what is 
needed is an approach to identify on the one hand the transnational character of these processes, 
which cut  through the various layers of governance and ʻtake place in several national contexts 
simultaneously  ʼ (van Apeldoorn 2004: 145, emphasis in original), as well as to explain their 
form and content with regard to the underlying political project. 
 There is, then, an apparent need for a study of the transformation of European Governance 
which takes into account not only the political dimension of corporate governance regulation, 
but also the evidence of transnational forces that sustain corporate governance transformation, 
such as for instance transnationally mobile institutional investors or ʻprivate  ʼ expert groups 
involved in agenda setting. 
4 Corporate governance in the European Union - developments and research scope
In the last couple of years, there has been an increasing number of indications that a market for 
corporate control is emerging in Europe (Höpner and Jackson 2001; Lannoo 1999; Lannoo and 
Khachaturyan 2003).  The volume of unsolicited takeover bids in the EU has been increasing 
steadily, and the number now actually surpasses the number of takeovers in the US (Wells and 
Saigol 2004). The Financial Services and Action Plan (FSAP) (European Commission 1999) 
outlines a broad restructuring of European ﬁnancial markets to advance the further integration 
of the single market. The Takeover Directive has to be seen as an integral element of this 
framework, as the Commission points out in the FSAP. 
The proposal for take-over bids (13th Company Law) Directive will facilitate the 
restructuring of the ﬁnancial industry – a process which has been gathering pace- and mark 
an important milestone in the emergence of an open market in EU corporate ownership 
(European Commission 1999).
The deepening of European capital and ﬁnancial markets is an essential prerequisite for the 
emergence of a market for corporate control. While the market for corporate control constitutes 
a distinct market from the markets for goods, land, labour and capital (Windolf 1994), it is none 
the less dependent on a functioning capital market since corporate control is inextricably linked 
to vote-carrying securities traded on capital markets. It is crucial with regard to this project, 
thus, that research on the emergence for a market of corporate control in the EU can not simply 
focus on the Takeover Directive alone, but also has to be concerned with the integration of 
capital markets which are necessary to bring it about. With regard to the theoretical framework 
of this research, I will argue below that this facilitates setting the Takeover Directive and the 
push for a market for corporate control into the broader picture of a political framework for the 
integration of ﬁnancial markets in the EU (cf Bieling and Steinhilber 2002).
8At the same time, however, European company law is still predominantly determined at the 
national level, and various institutional arrangements render takeovers less likely (and less 
desirable) in some member states, while corporate control in other member states is far more 
marketised (Heine and Kerber 2002). This gives rise to regulatory tensions which constitute an 
inherent element of the political struggles over corporate governance regulation in the EU.  
 In the following, I want to give a brief overview of the developments around the Takeover 
Directive, which then serves as an illustration of the research scope and some of the issues and 
tensions that form the empirical part of this project. 
 The EU Commission has been pushing hard for its Takeover Directive, which, after many 
years of struggle and a crushing defeat in the European Parliament in 2001, ﬁnally came into 
force in May 2004, albeit in a diluted compromise form. Whereas the directive started off in the 
1980s with the objective to harmonize takeover regulation (see the explanatory memorandum 
of the 2002 proposal,  European Commission 2002), in the course of the negotiations with 
the European Parliament (EP) and the Council it gradually shifted away from ʻone size ﬁts 
all  ʼ harmonization towards more market-driven and self-regulated mechanisms. Rather than 
introducing strong regulation to bring about harmonization, the Commission thus took a more 
pro-competitive and proactively market-opening stance (what Fritz Scharpf would call ʻ negative 
integration  ʼ (Scharpf 1999: 45). In its 2001 proposal for the directive, the Commission had 
introduced the ʻboard neutrality ruleʼ, which required the target companyʼs board to get the 
shareholders  ʼpermission for enacting any measure which could result in a frustration of the 
bid. The rejection of this proposal in the EP in July 2004 was, among other reasons, based on 
the perception that with the diverse models of company law in the EU, the board neutrality 
rule would disadvantage member states where structural barriers against takeovers were not 
in force.3 This lack of a ʻlevel playing ﬁeldʼ, i.e. equal opportunities for takeover bids and 
shareholder decision-making, was perceived to be the biggest obstacle to European takeover 
legislation. The Commission, however, did not discard its plans for the takeover directive and 
commissioned a High Level Group of Company Experts (HLG) to tackle the problem of the 
level playing ﬁeld. The HLG presented its report on takeover bids in January 2002 (High 
Level Group of Company Experts 2002), in which they devised the ʻbreakthrough rule  ʼ as a 
solution to the problem of the lack of a level playing ﬁeld. This breakthrough rule would quite 
literally enable a bidder to ʻbreak through  ʼstructural pre-bid barriers like multiple voting rights 
and voting restrictions once a certain threshold of control over the target company has been 
reached. This would result in a playing ﬁeld which would, at least temporarily in case of a bid, 
provide bidders for a company under this regulation with a barrier-free target company. At the 
same time, the shareholders of the company, under the board neutrality rule, would ultimately 
decide on whether to accept the bid. Taken together, this would result in a level playing ﬁeld 
with ultimate shareholder decision-making, as envisaged by the Commission. Yet, since the 
Commission expected considerable opposition from member states where structural barriers 
constituted an integral part of company law, it only drafted a ʻ mini breakthrough rule  ʼin its 2002 
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2002). This, however, led to heated debates and negotiations in the Council and the EP over 
the issue of the level playing ﬁeld again. In the end, a compromise drafted by the Council 
was supplemented in the directive, which renders the board neutrality rule and the full break-
through rule optional under the authority of the member states. This compromise directive was 
thus accepted by the EP in December 2003 and has come in force in May 2004 - much to the 
disappointment of the Commissioner for the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein, one of the most 
outspoken advocates of European takeover regulation. After the directive was accepted, he was 
adamant in his criticism: 
I am not going to pretend that I am pleased with this agreement. Nor am I going to be 
hypocritical by pretending that the version of the Directive agreed today represents a step 
forward for EU competitiveness or for the integration of EU capital markets (Bolkestein 2003). 
The directive will have to be implemented into national law by the Member States by may 2006 
– until then, it remains  to be seen to which extent the optional arrangements will be enacted. 
Also, the directive will be subject to revision in 2011. 
6 Research interests and questions
Drawing on the above descriptive delineation of the scope of this research project, I now want 
to introduce some of the relevant and highly interesting issues which, from a political economy 
perspective, pertain to corporate governance regulation in the EU in general, and takeover 
regulation in particular. Subsequently, I will submit the general research questions underlying 
this project, as well as some of the limits of this project. In turn, a ﬁrst sketch of my theoretical 
framework will outline how I intend to go about interpreting and analysing these research 
problems as well as operationalising my research questions. 
 While many studies of the transformation of European corporate governance are rather 
outcome-focused, this project departs from the position that, rather than merely analysing the 
results of changes in  regulation, the research focus of this project will be on how and why these 
transformations take place. This can only come about by, to a certain extent, historicising the 
events and changes in corporate governance regulation. The ʻendless saga  ʼ(Skog 2002) of the 
Takeover Directive, for instance, can not be understood outside the very speciﬁc context of 
the integration of the European Single Market. Also, it is crucial to contextualise it within the 
broader setting of the development of company law in Europe. The shift from the Commissionʼs 
initial position to a more market-driven approach, the repeated contestation of the Directive 
in the EP and the Council and the eventual coming into force of the Directive pose complex 
questions about the cui bono of takeover regulation. One of the main issues is in whose interest 
this speciﬁc form of takeover regulation would be, and which actors in turn advocate these 
interests. In this regard, the role of the Commission in pushing the directive based on the thrust 
of a larger project of European (market) integration will form an integral part of the research 
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 It is also crucial to analyse in how far the form and the content of the Directive and other 
transformations are interrelated. With regard to changes in the content of regulation, the shift 
towards pro-competition and increasingly process-oriented provisions instead of harmonizing 
and institutionalizing measures has to be accounted for. With regard to the form, the use of 
consultancy terms such as benchmarking of corporate governance codes to arrive at a ʻbest 
practice  ʼ fosters this change of corporate governance regulation by furthering the tendency 
towards self-regulation which is an inherent feature of market-oriented corporate governance 
Also, the changing modus for regulative processes, as with for instance the Lamfalussy Process 
or the increased use of expert groups to advance certain positions (e.g. the High Level Group 
of Company High Level Group of Company Experts 2002) will be part of the research focus. 
With regard to the latter, it is essential to analyse in how far these ʻneutral  ʼexperts actually 
inﬂuence and set the agenda for political processes and decisions on corporate governance 
regulation. 
 Although, as mentioned above, the overarching focus of this project is on why 
transformations in corporate governance regulation take place, it will nonetheless be essential to 
ﬁrst identify the changes and evaluate in how far they entail a signiﬁcant shift from the hitherto 
diverse European landscape of takeover regulation, company law and varieties of capitalism 
in general to a different form – whether this will turn out to be a process of convergence, 
persistence or hybrid formation remains to be seen.  
 Drawing on these concerns, the central research questions for this project are outlined 
below.  
- What changes in the regulation of corporate governance can we observe in the 
European arena, in particular with regard to the emergence of a market for corporate 
control? 
- How and through which modes of regulation do these changes take place? Do they 
imply a shift from public to private actors, for instance the High Level Group of 
Company experts? 
- What accounts for the transformation of corporate governance regulation in both 
form/modus and content? In particular, what is the role of the EU in creating a 
market for corporate control in Europe?
The Takeover Directive, as one of the prime efforts of the Commission to advance a European 
market for corporate control, is a particularly apposite and interesting focal point for the study 
of the transformation of corporate governance in the EU. At the same time, however, the limits 
of this research project have to delineated, also with regard to the Takeover Directive. While 
national takeover regulation clearly is an important factor for member states  ʼ preferences 
regarding European takeover regulation, this project will not focus on any national context in a 
comprehensive way. Although it clearly is of great signiﬁcance which Member States will decide 
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to implement the optional arrangements, this project is not concerned with ʻEuropeanisation  ʼof 
corporate governance in the sense of how European regulation is inﬂuencing national corporate 
governance regimes and regulation (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Radaelli 2000) Thus, 
extensive  national case studies will not be part of this research. Rather, I intend to use the 
examples of various countries  ʼapproach to the Takeover Directive to locate transnational actors 
and to show the various interest constellations and struggles arising from the Directive. 
 Although the main focus in this research will be on management-shareholder relations with 
regard to the paradigm shift towards increased shareholder-decision making, the emergence of 
a market for corporate control and the transformation of corporate governance regulation in 
general has far-reaching consequences for various other stakeholders, most of all labour. A 
more thorough theorizing of the ʻstakeholder approachʼ, however, would mean going beyond 
the scope of this research – although the need for such an attempt is  often acknowledged 
(Blair and Stout 1999; Tirole 2001). Rather, within the framework of the discussion of whether 
there is a power shift towards (certain) shareholders, the changing position and interests of 
stakeholders, and in particular labour/employees, will be taken into account as well. Since the 
EU is not operating in a political vacuum, and since the focus of this research is explicitly on the 
transnational dimension of corporate governance regulation, developments and events outside 
the EU also have to be acknowledged. Dewing and Russel, for instance, point out that ʼit is 
interesting to consider the inﬂuence of the US on the EU and vice versa on policy developments 
in accounting, auditing and corporate governance.“ (Dewing and Russell 2004: 291) However, 
the predominant focus of this project will remain on the European arena.
7 Theoretical framework 
Drawing on earlier sections of this research outline, I now intend to give a very rough outline 
of where to locate this research project theoretically. This I will do by, on the one hand, framing 
the research questions in the broader context of a shift towards increased marketisation of 
European corporate governance and, on the other hand, by clarifying some of the concepts that 
are key to this process. The underlying tenet of this framework is based on the perception that 
any corporate governance regime and the transformations pertaining to it are an expression 
of a political process, motivated by certain interests and most likely contested by others. As 
Susan Strange maintains, ʻthese arrangements are not divinely ordained, nor are they fortuitous 
outcomes of blind chance. Rather, they are the results of human decisions taken in the context 
of man-made institutions and sets of self-set rules and customs  ʼ(Strange 1988: 18 ). 
 With this in mind, it is crucial to reveal and analyse these political dimensions. The current 
transformation in corporate governance regulation, thus, as I will argue, represents a shift 
towards the commodiﬁcation, that is, the marketisation of corporate control in the European 
Union. 
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7.1 The commodiﬁcation of corporate control 
Since in a functioning market for corporate control publicly listed companies are subjugated 
to the laws of this market, they themselves become a commodity (Windolf 1994: 81). If this is 
the case, as Polanyi argues, under the logic of the market, ʻno arrangement or behaviour should 
be allowed to exist that might prevent the actual functioning of the market mechanism on the 
lines of the commodity ﬁction  ʼ(Polanyi 1957: 73).  This, of course, has major consequences 
for the socio-economic conﬁguration of any systems where the market for corporate control is 
established. Drawing on Polanyi, I intend to sketch to which extent the market for corporate 
control impacts on existing institutional and socio-economic arrangements, and in how far the 
logic of the takeover market is ultimately based on market-driven assumptions which aim at 
further disembedding the corporation from its societal context. 
 The perception of a company as a commodity which can be bought and sold is one of 
the underlying principles of this process – based on neoclassical economical assumptions 
of rational actors and the fundamental efﬁciency of the market. The basic mechanism of the 
market for corporate control is commonly assumed to be the chance ʻfor the good to take over 
the bad  ʼ(Bolkestein 2004). The evaluation of ʻgood  ʼor ʻbad  ʼperformance, in this respect, takes 
place on the grounds of shareholder value, i.e. the maximisation of share price and cash ﬂow to 
the shareholders (Rappaport 1998). Any other objectives than the maximisation of shareholder 
value, as mentioned in the ﬁrst part of this outline, are thus perceived as obstructing the proper 
functioning of the market. Rather, the market for corporate control is assumed to be an apolitical 
institution for buying and selling publicly listed companies. Interestingly, when looking at the 
actual process of corporate takeovers, it becomes apparent that they are far from being detached 
from social interaction (see f.ex. the PR battle during the Mannesmann Vodafone takeover 
(Höpner and Jackson 2001). Granovetterʼs concept of the ʻembeddedness of economic action  ʼ
grasps this neglect very well by arguing that
Neoclassical economics are operating with an atomized, undersocialized conception of 
human action. […] The theoretical arguments disallow by hypothesis any impact of social 
structure and social relations on production, distribution or consumption. (Granovetter 
1985: 483)
Another aspect of this marketisation of corporate control is the redistributional consequence of 
a functioning market for corporate control. De Jong has shown that in a corporate governance 
regimes characterized by the absence of a market for corporate control, a higher share of net 
added value is being paid to employees and other stakeholders, while in comparison to this in 
corporate governance regimes which, like the Anglo-Saxon model, sustain a market for corporate 
control, about 3-4 times the share of net added value is being paid to shareholders (de Jong 
1997: 18). This redistribution raises serious questions of in whose interest the emergence of 
corporate control would be, and which consequences it could have for other groups.  
 This also pertains to questions about both the form and the content of takeover regulation, 
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which can be seen as being increasingly market-oriented. The reliance on processes of 
benchmarking and ﬁnding a ʻbest practice  ʼ can be set within this context. The deﬁnition of 
what ʻbest practice  ʼentails, however, is ultimately based on political decisions. Whatʼs more, 
with the new Takeover Directive in force and other parallel developments granting far-reaching 
rights to companies to decide in which jurisdiction they want to incorporate,4 this development 
is likely to lead to an increase in regulatory competition. 
 The basic idea of regulatory competition is that, in the long run, competition 
among  corporate laws can be seen as a process of experimentation that leads to the  
emergence and selection of superior corporate laws  (Heine and Kerber 2002: 61) 
 This, however, means that the role of public actors in the regulation of the market for 
corporate control is further eroded, since companies  ʼdecision to be regulated under a speciﬁc 
jurisdiction is by no means subject to any democratic control, but merely based on market-
driven principles. 
7.2 Social forces in the making of corporate governance regulation in the EU 
The perpetuation of this market-oriented principle of corporate governance also requires 
an analysis of the role of various ʻexperts  ʼin advancing it. With regard to this in the area of 
corporate governance, Dewing and Russell assert that 
in contrast to auditing and accounting (subjects amenable to the application of  
private-sector professional and technical expertise), there is no equivalent  international 
corporate governance ʻprofession  ʼthat has produced ʻready made  ʼ corporate governance 
ʻsolutions  ʼ(Dewing and Russell 2004: 300). 
In contrast to this, I would argue that we are actually witnessing a development where corporate 
governance networks and ʻexperts  ʼ having an increasing inﬂuence on policy making and 
agenda setting While the ʻsolutions  ʼthey offer are, of course, still highly contested, it is none 
the less essential to analyse their role in propagating and disseminating their ʻversion  ʼof ʻgood 
corporate governance  ʼin the context of the transformation of corporate governance in the EU 
(and, for that matter, on a wider scale, since these networks tend to have external links (mainly) 
to the US) (see f.ex. High Level Group of Company Experts 2002).  Gramsciʼs notion of the 
role of the ʻorganic intellectuals  ʼwill probably provide a useful heuristic here to show how 
these private and supposedly neutral ʻexperts  ʼare not only instrumental in sustaining speciﬁc 
political choices, but are actually proactively contributing to the perpetuation of a market-driven 
corporate governance regime. 
 By focusing on the contested nature and the open-ended character of the transformation of 
corporate governance regulation rather than the mechanics of persistence, the actors and ʻsocial 
forces  ʼ advancing and contesting these regulative transformations become important. These 
social forces are ʻlocated in the wider structure of the social relations of production, which do 
not determine but shape their interests and identities  ʼ[emphasis in original] (Bieler and Morton 
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2001) By linking these forces to a concrete political project, the agenda behind speciﬁc political 
decisions and developments can be accounted for. The salience of identifying transnational 
agency in the process of the restructuring and transformation of European capitalism has been 
demonstrated in previous studies (see f.ex. van Apeldoorn 2002 on the European Roundtable 
of Industrialists) – however, to date there is no account of which transnational actors shape the 
processes of corporate governance regulation in the European Union, and which ideological 
underpinnings and political strategies motivate them. 
 With regard to the increased marketisation mentioned above, this has to be seen within 
the context of what Stephen Gill has characterised as ʻnew constitutionalismʼ.
to separate economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make 
governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less 
responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes […] Central objectives in this 
discourse are security of property rights and investor freedoms, and market discipline on 
the state and on labour to secure credibility in the eyes of private investors, e.g. those in 
both the global currency and capital markets. (Gill 1998: 5)
This pertains also to the underlying ʻsocial purpose  ʼ of the European integration project 
(van Apeldoorn 2002), and thus of corporate governance regulation as such. To contextualise 
corporate governance regulation as part of the broader context of the European integration project 
means that the fundamentally political dimension of these transformations can be exposed. 
While there have been ﬁrst attempts at conceptualising corporate governance regulation along 
these lines (Bieling and Steinhilber 2002), there has not been a systemic analysis of in how far 
this contextualisation can help to answer the question of why the marketisation of corporate 
control is so ardently advanced, and why this regulation takes the form that is does. There is 
also an apparent need to move beyond the still somewhat state-centric analysis of the varieties 
of capitalism and corporate governance regimes in particular. This research project seeks to 
ﬁll these gaps, and to help bring about a deeper understanding of the changes in corporate 
governance regulation. 
 Contrary to what Hansman and Kraakman argue (2001), ʻthe history of company law  ʼ
and corporate governance is anything but over. Quite the opposite, with the ongoing politics 
around the transformation of corporate governance regulation, we are in for a whole lot more 
developments in the future. While this necessarily means writing on a moving target, the very 
excitement and signiﬁcance of corporate governance regulation for socio-economic conditions 
are bound to make this project extremely interesting, to say the least. 
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Notes
1 For a detailed overview on anti-takeover defences, see Shleifer and Vishny, ʻA survey  of Corporate Governance  ʼ
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1996). A Survey of Corporate Governance. NBER Working Papers. Cambridge
2 Already in 1965, Andrew Shonﬁeld had observed the alternative structures of modern capitalism  Andrew 
Shonﬁeld (1965), Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power Oxord UP
3 Companies in member states with structural barriers to takeovers (f.ex. voting caps, multiple voting rights) would 
still have means to obstruct or frustrate a takeover. 
4 See f.ex. the the Centros and Überseering decisions of the ECJ (for a good overview on regulatory developments 
in company law in general see (Heine and Kerber 2002). 
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